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Pondering Financial Reporting: 
Remarks Before the 2018 Leet 
Business Law Symposium 
Commissioner Hester M. Peirce† 
Thank you for the opportunity to be here today. I will begin with 
my standard disclaimer. The views I express today are my own and do 
not necessarily represent the views of the Commission or my fellow 
Commissioners. 
It is a real honor to be back at Case Western Reserve University a 
quarter of a century after graduating. As a wide-eyed freshman, I lived 
just down the street in the North Side dorms. I took the LSAT right 
here in the law school. On nice days, I used to study out in front of the 
art museum, where I could gaze at the statue of Rodin’s The Thinker 
for inspiration in my own thinking. This statue is one of the 
approximately ten large versions created during the master’s lifetime 
under his watch.1 The museum acquired the statue in 1917, 
coincidentally the year Rodin died.2 
As you may know, the Cleveland version of The Thinker is not fully 
intact. The Thinker arrived whole and enjoyed more than fifty years of 
uninterrupted thought.3 Then, in the middle of a March night in 1970, 
someone placed a bomb underneath the statue’s base.4 The Thinker has 
continued to ponder for another almost fifty years, but the bombing 
literally knocked the legs out from under him and surely affected his 
thinking in some form or fashion. 
Today, I want to talk to you about an attempt to knock the legs 
out from under many years of thinking regarding financial reporting 
and securities disclosure by public companies. Specifically, I want to 
talk with you about the role that financial reporting plays in giving 
investors a window into the companies they own. Recently, some people 
have suggested that financial reporting should perform other functions 
too.5 I contend that we need to be very careful in making changes to 
something that is so central to the functioning of our economy. 
 
†  Commissioner of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. 
1. Rodin’s The Thinker, Clev. Museum of Art, https://www.clevelandart. 
org/research/conservation/rodins-thinker [https://perma.cc/7QVW-LN5K] 
(last visited Mar. 24, 2019). 
2. Id.  
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. See, e.g., Alana L. Griffin et al., Institutional Investors Petition the SEC 
to Require ESG Disclosures, Bus. L. Today (Jan. 11, 2019), https:// 
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To understand its importance, it may be helpful to start with a 
quick outline of the financial reporting process itself. It is probably 
worth throwing in some history as well. 
Financial reporting is not new. For as long as investors have been 
investing in enterprises, one imagines they wanted insight into how 
their money was being used. Double-entry bookkeeping, or debits and 
credits, began over five hundred years ago.6 Later, during the Industrial 
Revolution, railroad companies found they needed a coherent system 
for presenting their operations to prospective investors, which paved 
the way for the development of financial reporting.7 Other companies 
then began to follow suit.8 Soon the need for a reliable financial 
accounting and reporting framework became evident. The framework 
would have to pull together existing practices and provide a uniform 
set of standards for companies so that investors could readily 
understand the financial statements of various companies. 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), which were 
built on time-tested standards, brought that much-needed uniformity 
to financial accounting and reporting. By using GAAP, companies can 
produce financial reports that are consistent, which allows investors to 
compare and analyze different companies. The Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB), which was created in 1973,9 maintains the 
standards under authority given to it by the SEC.10 GAAP are not 
static, so the FASB’s work is ongoing as it adjusts standards to allow 
for better, more comparable financial reporting. 
Having skimmed the surface of a bit of the history, we can now dive 
into the process of financial reporting itself. The primary actor is the 
company. As the SEC’s Chief Accountant, Wes Bricker, has noted, 
“high-quality financial reporting starts with companies.”11 As a first 
 
businesslawtoday.org/2019/01/institutional-investors-petition-sec-require- 
esg-disclosures/ [https://perma.cc/45CC-J9YY]. 
6. Accounting Standards, Fin. Acct. Found., https://www.accounting 
foundation.org/jsp/Foundation/Page/FAFSectionPage&cid=1351027541272 
[https://perma.cc/DSY6-D4PH] (last visited Mar. 24, 2019). 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. Id.; About the FASB, Fin. Acct. Standards Board, https://www.fasb. 
org/jsp/FASB/Page/SectionPage&cid=1176154526495 [https://perma.cc/ 
S8R9-7X28] (last visited Mar. 24, 2019). 
10. Statement of Policy on the Establishment and Improvement of 
Accounting Principles and Standards, Accounting Series Release No. 150 
(Dec. 20, 1973).  
11. Wesley Bricker, Chief Accountant, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks to the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales: The 
Intersection of Financial Reporting and Innovation (June 6, 2018), 
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step before reporting begins, the company creates the reporting 
environment through the development of appropriate internal controls. 
These company policies dictate how the company will make its 
decisions, who has the authority to act on behalf of the company, how 
these decisions and transactions are documented, and what checks 
ensure that the company adheres to its own policies. A company that 
maintains insufficient controls will have difficulty presenting its 
financial condition accurately to investors. Equally troubling, the 
company’s managers will have difficulty understanding its own financial 
condition, which makes management tough. Additionally, the company 
will be at the mercy of wrongdoers within its ranks if it lacks the proper 
controls to flag questionable activity. Federal securities laws now 
require these controls, but even without such a statutory mandate, only 
a foolhardy company would operate without controls.12 
Having controls in place is just a start. The company must 
document the controls and all authorized transactions in its books and 
records.13 This documentation forms the backbone of the actual 
financial reporting process. For companies subject to the U.S. federal 
securities laws, the responsibility for maintaining books and records in 
reasonable detail is assigned to the companies themselves.14 Again, even 
without a statutory mandate, this arrangement makes sense; companies 
are in the best position to maintain their own books and records. These 
books and records are the building blocks of financial statements that 
are “comparable, verifiable, timely, and understandable by investors 
and others.”15 
Although financial reporting starts with companies, a number of 
outside parties also have a role in the process. People reading the 
financial reports might not be inclined to trust them simply because 
companies say they have implemented internal controls and complied 
with GAAP. An independent third party—the independent auditors—
must review the company’s financial statements and issue an opinion.16 
Auditors add credibility to financial reports by performing procedures 
to determine whether the financial reports are presented fairly in 
accordance with GAAP. For an audit to be effective it must be 
objective and performed by auditors who are “ethical, independent, 
skeptical, and who apply the diligence necessary to meet professional 
 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-bricker-060618 [https://perma. 
cc/G388-MZ4S]. 
12. See 15 U.S.C. 78m(b)(2) (2012). 
13. Id. 
14. See id. 
15. See Bricker, supra note 11. 
16. Id. 
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and regulatory standards.”17 These auditors are overseen by the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), which was 
established to develop standards to ensure these objectives are met in 
public-company audits.18 Even before the establishment of the PCAOB 
after the Enron and WorldCom debacles, auditors were subject to 
professional standards, which helped investors to trust the auditors’ 
work.19 
Because of their position as the last check on a company’s 
financials, auditors often serve as attractive scapegoats when a 
company runs off the rails.20 When a company has been poorly run and 
subsequently collapses, however, we should look first to management, 
not the auditors. While the auditors perform a vital function, their role 
is limited to ensuring that the financial statements are free of material 
misstatements. They do not assess whether a company is well-run, nor 
is it their job to ferret out every instance of negligence or malfeasance.  
A recent example from the United Kingdom serves to illustrate the 
point. In January 2018, Carillion, a British facilities management and 
construction services firm, was forced to liquidate with £29 million in 
cash and £1.3 billion in debt.21 The liquidation came shortly after the 
company announced an £845 million write-down on unprofitable, long-
term construction projects, the value of which declined at the same time 
that the company’s debt increased significantly.22 Carillion’s collapse 
left many wondering how a failure of this magnitude could go unnoticed 
for so long. In response to public outcry, politicians turned their sights 
on the auditors, some of whom are calling for a forced break-up of the 
Big Four.23 I cannot offer any opinion on the quality of audit work done 
 
17. Id. 
18. About the PCAOB, PCAOBUS, https://www.pcaobus.com/About [https:// 
perma.cc/VX7U-JVPX] (last visited Mar. 25, 2019).  
19. Daniel L. Goelzer, Bd. Member, Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 
Address at Investment Company Institute Tax Conference: Restoring 
Public Confidence (Sept. 15, 2003) (transcript available on the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board website). 
20. Florian Hoos et al., Why are Auditors Blamed When Something Goes 
Wrong? Experimental Evidence, 22 Int. J. Audit. 422, 422 (2018). 
21. The Carillion Failure: Misunderstood Risks and Constrained Auditors, 
Tone at the Top, June 2018, at 1–2, https://dl.theiia.org/ 
AECPublic/Tone-at-the-Top-June-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VWY-
ATGJ]. 
22. Id. at 1. 
23. Work and Pensions and BEIS Committees Publish Report on Carillion, 
Parliament (May 16, 2018), https://www.parliament.uk/business/ 
committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/work-and-pensions-committee/ 
news-parliament-2017/carillion-report-published-17-19/ [https://perma.cc/ 
Y699-UGV5] (quoting an MP’s assertion that KPMG, PwC, Deloitte, and 
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for Carillion. Rather, this example shows how quickly and completely 
the public’s attention often turns to auditors and therefore away from 
management. 
Firms that assume the role of outside auditor take on a heavy 
burden, and so they should. They are an integral part of our reporting 
system and, in return for their position of trust (and the comfortable 
fees that accompany that position), they assume certain obligations. 
We must be careful, however, to lay on them only the burden they are 
designed to bear. The financial reporting process begins with the 
company. The company is responsible for designing and implementing 
internal controls, keeping its books and records, and ensuring that 
management is held properly accountable. Blaming the auditors for the 
company’s failures not only overstates the role of auditors, it also lets 
the company off the hook and reduces the incentive for other companies 
to keep their own houses in order. 
Along with companies and auditors, the SEC also has a role in the 
financial reporting process. The SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance 
selectively reviews filings to monitor compliance with financial 
accounting and disclosure requirements.24 Our Office of the Chief 
Accountant answers questions from accountants and auditors and 
works with FASB, PCAOB, and international standard-setters.25 
This entire process, from developing and maintaining internal 
controls to auditing financial statements to reviewing and establishing 
accounting standards, is not a source of revenue; to the contrary, the 
process is a consumer of resources. Companies must devote staff hours, 
information technology, and management time to the process, and they 
hire outside experts to complete the work. They pay for auditors and 
they fund the PCAOB and FASB.26 The costs incurred by the SEC in 
its oversight role are also part of the price for the financial reporting 
process. 
Why bother? Why focus so much energy on and why pour so many 
resources into company financial statements? Investors need this 
information to make good choices about how to invest their money. 
Financial reporting is essential for effective capital allocation, which, in 
turn, is critical to our economy. As Wes Bricker said when he spoke to 
the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales in June,  
EY charged millions of pounds for auditing companies even though they 
did not warn about the financial dangers facing companies like Carillion). 
24. Division of Corporation Finance, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Jan. 29, 
2019), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cffilingreview.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/ZXR5-9SCB]. 
25. Wesley Bricker, Chief Accountant, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement 
in Connection with the 2018 AICPA Conference on Current SEC and 
PCAOB Developments (Dec. 10, 2018). 
26. 15 U.S.C. § 7219 (2012). 
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“[A]n efficient [capital] allocation process would not be possible without 
financial disclosures, because adequate and high-quality information 
helps investors to judge the opportunities and risks of investment 
choices accurately.”27 
There is not enough capital to fund every idea. Funds are limited. 
An accurate financial picture of a company—a picture that is 
comparable with the pictures of other companies and a picture that is 
a credible representation of reality—is a key input in an investment 
decision. These capital investments encourage economic growth by 
channeling funds to productive investments. Productive investments, 
in turn, are a boon to society. They produce life-saving drugs,28 new 
ways of processing data,29 and new ways of getting around.30 So in a 
way, the railroads, by setting us on the road to uniform financial 
reporting, helped pave the way for their competition—the automobile 
and the commercial jet—to get funded. 
Public companies, pursuant to our securities laws, make disclosures 
in addition to accounting disclosures. These disclosures provide context 
for the financial statements. Again, the purpose of these disclosures is 
to help investors make an assessment about the long-term value of the 
companies’ shares of which they are considering buying or to which 
they are considering lending money. Remembering why we engage in 
financial reporting and disclosures under the securities laws helps us to 
understand its limits and resist efforts to rethink its purposes. 
If information about a company is so important to investors and, 
by extension, to the rest of society, wouldn’t it make more sense simply 
to require companies to disclose everything? If information is good, 
more is always better, right? Not necessarily. In fact, almost certainly 
not. First, as I mentioned earlier, disclosure entails cost. There is, of 
course, the cost of gathering the information itself, but that is just one 
line item on the bill. Reviewing the information, ensuring its accuracy, 
and presenting it in a way that is consistent with the law is costly too. 
Such review and presentation require the assistance of experts—very 
expensive experts such as lawyers and accountants. And, of course, 
there is the cost of incurring legal risk. Every disclosure an issuer makes 
can give rise to a lawsuit by the government or investors if it is 
 
27. Bricker, supra note 11. 
28. Amy Brown et al., Pharma, Biotech & Medtech Half-Year 
Review 2018 10 (2018). 
29. Herbert B. Dixon Jr., Cloud Computing, 51 Judges J. 36, 36 (2012).  
30. Dan Blystone, The Story of Uber, Investopedia (Aug. 9, 2018), https:// 
www.investopedia.com/articles/personal-finance/111015/story-uber.asp 
[https://perma.cc/X4BX-X4FG]. 
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inaccurate,31 incomplete,32 or simply improperly disclosed. The potential 
for legal action means lots of costly expert attention to detail and, if 
legal action occurs, many more expensive expert hours and burdensome 
management distraction. Lucrative for lawyers and accountants, but 
quite the opposite for the companies and—ultimately investors—
footing the bill. 
So, more is not always better even from the investors’ viewpoint. 
The more a company must pay to make a disclosure, the less money is 
left for shareholders to receive in the form of dividends or increased 
company value. A company’s shareholders may also worry that the 
disclosure of too much information could make it vulnerable to 
competitors.33 There is also investor cost in terms of the time she spends 
wading through disclosures. Reliable, relevant information helps an 
investor evaluate whether a company’s stock is a good buy, and the 
investor is helped by having access to information that will help her 
make that decision, but she does not want pages of disclosures that are 
irrelevant to her question: is this company a good bet? 
How do we decide, then, what a company should or must disclose? 
Our federal securities laws have rested on the foundational principle 
that issuers should disclose that information that is material to 
investors.34 A fact is material if “disclosure of the omitted fact would 
have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly 
altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.”35 This “total 
mix” has been traditionally understood to mean information about 
whether the company is likely to provide a return on investment to the 
investor. In other words, investors need—and our securities laws strive 
to provide them with—information about the long-term financial value 
of the company. 
Materiality is a cornerstone of our regulations. In most cases, if a 
company omits or misstates a fact, the company faces liability only if 
 
31. Edward Rock, Securities Regulation as Lobster Trap: A Credible 
Commitment Theory of Mandatory Disclosure, 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 675, 
687 (2002). 
32. Id. 
33. Shelley Parratt, Deputy Dir., Div. of Corp. Fin., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 
Speech by SEC Staff: Executive Compensation: Observations on the 2009 
Proxy Season and Expectations for 2010 (Nov. 9, 2009). 
34. Business Roundtable, The Materiality Standard for Public Company 
Disclosure: Maintain What Works (Oct. 2015), https://s3.amazonaws. 
com/brt.org/archive/reports/BRT.The%20Materiality%20Standard%20 
for%20Public%20Company%20Disclosure.2015.10.29.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
C9G7-Y53F]. 
35. Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988) (quoting TSC Industries, 
Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)). 
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the fact is material.36 For example, if a company miscalculates a number 
by a penny, it is unlikely that that misstatement is material.37 The 
reasonable investor is unlikely to reach a different conclusion about her 
investment in the company because a number was off by one cent. If a 
company miscalculates by a much larger number, the likelihood that 
the misstatement is material increases. 
It will come as no surprise to a room full of lawyers that what 
constitutes materiality has been defined, in part, through litigation. If 
a company is facing litigation over an allegedly material misstatement 
or omission, one way the court will determine whether the misstatement 
was indeed material is to look at the company’s stock price.38 If the 
correction of the misinformation or omission had a sizable impact on 
the company’s stock price, that is evidence in support of materiality.  
In other words, a decreased stock price can indicate that investors do 
indeed find that the information has significantly altered the total mix 
of information available. As you can imagine, however, conducting 
these types of event studies is difficult. 
The difficulty of putting limits around materiality has long 
bedeviled the SEC. In a speech forty years ago, then-Commissioner 
Roberta Karmel noted that “the Commission is being accused of 
substituting moral for economic or legal materiality.”39 She further 
noted, people outside the SEC were pushing the SEC in that direction 
by requiring “disclosure of matters which are not necessarily 
economically material,” specifically environmental disclosure.40 She 
hoped that trend would not continue, but in recent years it has gained 
steam.41 People whose primary interests are not in the long-term value 
of companies have realized the power of our mandatory reporting 
regime and have grabbed hold of it for their own purposes.42 
In recent years, there has been a call from some commenters to 
realign the boundaries of what must be disclosed by public companies, 
and therefore what we deem “material.”43 If materiality is determined 
 
36. Arnold S. Jacobs, What is a Misleading Statement or Omission Under 
10b-5?, 42 Fordham L. R. 243, 251 (1973). 
37. Id. 
38. See id. at 251, 253. 
39. Roberta S. Karmel, Commissioner, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks to 
Financial Executives Institute International Conference: Qualitative and 
Differential Disclosure (Oct. 17, 1979), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ 
1979/101779karmel.pdf [https://perma.cc/VB65-V3SB]. 
40. Id. at 11–12. 
41. See Alana L. Griffin et al., supra note 5. 
42. See id. 
43. Id. 
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by asking what the investor would want to know, the argument goes, 
why should the inquiry be limited to asking what the investor would 
want to know about a return on investment?44 If an investor is interested 
in knowing about a company’s labor practices—and if that information 
would “significantly alter the ‘total mix’ of information made 
available”45 to the investor about labor practices—should micro-level 
wage and salary data be deemed material? Or, if an investor cares a lot 
about the company’s use of green energy, isn’t all information about 
the mix of solar, wind, coal, and natural gas being used at each of the 
company’s offices material? Or, what about an investor who owns a 
trash hauling company with a big contract with the company and has 
a real interest in having the company not engage in waste reduction 
and recycling, so wants detailed information about refuse? Isn’t detailed 
information on the firm’s recycling program material? The answer to 
all these questions is no. 
First, there is a reason that we talk about materiality in terms of 
the “reasonable” investor. That modifier is intended to limit the 
language to ensure that a company is required to disclose information 
that is broadly useful to investors, not information that responds to 
idiosyncratic interests unrelated to the investment’s profitability.46 The 
term “material” would come to be meaningless if it meant information 
important to any investor. While one investor may care deeply about 
labor practices, another may care about whether the offices all have 
recycling bins, and yet another may worry about whether the company 
is increasing investment in certain geographic regions of the United 
States. “Materiality” has a stable meaning because it is not feasible to 
require the company to respond to the interests of individual investors, 
or even groups of investors. 
Second, even if a large number of investors wanted information 
about the same issue—the company’s environmental footprint, for 
example—the process for reporting or auditing this information is 
simply not reliable and auditable in the way that financial reporting 
is.47 As I mentioned earlier, financial reporting is a process that has 
developed over centuries, with methods that worked becoming codified 
and methods that did not work being discarded.48 Not only are the 
accounting methods themselves time-tested, but the process from 
 
44. See id. 
45. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). 
46. See id. at 448–49. 
47. See Brian Ballou et al., The Future of Corporate Sustainability Reporting, 
J. of Acct. (Dec. 1, 2006), https://www.journalofaccountancy.com/ 
issues/2006/dec/thefutureofcorporatesustainabilityreporting.html [https:// 
perma.cc/4Z5B-QXR9].  
48. See supra notes 6–9 and accompanying text. 
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developing internal controls to documenting the implementation of 
those controls to entering transactions into the company’s books to 
presenting those records for audit have been developed and refined over 
time.49 
Additionally, for many issues that may matter to certain investors, 
the data are not settled. Audited reporting suggests that there are clear 
standards that can be uniformly applied across companies, or even 
across industries.50 Soft issues like environmental footprints are simply 
not susceptible to this type of reporting or auditing.51 Nor is it easy for 
a regulator to assess the quality of disclosure on many of these soft 
issues.52 
Indeed, the Commission has struggled to implement requirements 
for the disclosure of non-material information that are driven by 
concern for constituencies other than investors.53 It is hard to know how 
to measure the effectiveness of such requirements. For example, eight 
years ago Congress directed us to require companies to make disclosures 
about the degree to which they use minerals from conflict zones.54 The 
hope was that the disclosure would discourage companies from sourcing 
minerals from areas of conflict, but the information is really hard to 
come by and is not necessarily material. Congress also directed us to 
disclose mine safety violations,55 which are already disclosed to one 
 
49. See Stephen Wagner & Lee Dittmar, The Unexpected Benefits of 
Sarbanes-Oxley, Fin. Mgmt. (April 2006), https://hbr.org/2006/04/the-
unexpected-benefits-of-sarbanes-oxley [https://perma.cc/TA4N-2SWL] 
(discussing how the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act helped 
develop the internal controls process). 
50. See, e.g., Steven B. Harris, Board Member, Pub. Co. Accounting 
Oversight Bd., Remarks at 2017 International Institute on Audit 
Regulation: Audit Industry Concentration and Potential Implications 
(Dec. 7, 2017) (transcript available on the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board website).  
51. See Jill M. D’Aquila, The Current State of Sustainability Report: A Work 
in Progress, CPA J. (July 2018), https://www.cpajournal.com/2018/07/ 
30/the-current-state-of-sustainability-reporting/ [https://perma.cc/GZ67- 
SBX] (discussing the challenges that hinder the adoption of sustainability 
reporting like environmental footprints).  
52. See Marlene Plumlee et al., Voluntary Environmental Disclosure Quality 
and Firm Value: Further Evidence, 34 J. Acct. & Pub. Pol’y 336, 337–
41 (2015) (noting the inconsistent quality of voluntary environmental 
disclosures). 
53. See Griffin, supra note 5 (noting that such requirements often fail because 
they do not fit SEC’s “long-standing principles-based” materiality 
framework).  
54. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p) (2012). 
55. See id. § 78m-2(a). 
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regulator and many of which are not material.56 Contrast these 
requirements with the disclosure requirements we issued just this week 
with respect to mining companies.57 We are updating the requirements 
governing how these companies disclose the extent of their mineral 
reserves, any obstacles to mining, and their plans for marketing the 
minerals they extract.58 These disclosure requirements were driven 
solely by investor need,59 so they are much more straightforward—I will 
not go so far as to say easy—to implement. 
Accounting itself is not black and white; it depends on the art and 
judgment of the accountant. Given the variability present in what 
seems like such a straightforward presentation—the amount of money 
a company has and how it is spending it—reporting less straightforward 
information raises considerable challenges. Consider, for example, a 
question such as “what are the company’s overseas labor practices?” 
What factors do we care about in answering this question? Perhaps 
that is not even the starting question. The starting question may be 
better phrased “what factors should we care about?” What is the 
purpose in asking the question? Often it is to determine whether 
workers are well-treated.60 But what does “well-treated” mean? How 
will we define this? What data will we use? How do we determine which 
data are relevant? These questions may be answered in five different 
ways by five different investors. Whether certain practices indeed 
benefit workers may vary wildly by industry and location.61 They may 
even vary by the idiosyncratic preferences of different workers 
themselves.62 
Of course, treating its workers well is one way a company can help 
build towards its long-term financial value. The company may choose 
 
56. See 30 U.S.C. § 813(h) (2012). 
57. Modernization of Property Disclosures for Mining Registrants, 83 Fed. 
Reg. 66,344 (Dec. 26, 2018) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 230, 
239, 249). 
58. See id. at 66, 346–47.  
59. See id. at 66, 344–45. 
60. V. Kumar & Anita Pansari, Measuring the Benefits of Employee 
Engagement, MIT: Sloan Mgmt. Rev. (June 16, 2015), https:// 
sloanreview.mit.edu/article/measuring-the-benefits-of-employee-engagement/ 
[https://perma.cc/YL5T-B5DG]. 
61. Int’l Integrated Reporting Council, Creating Value: The 
Value of Human Capital Reporting 3 (2016), https://integrated 
reporting.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/CreatingValueHumanCapital 
Reporting_IIRC06_16.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZVR7-JR43].  
62. James K. Harter et al., Business-Unit-Level Relationship Between 
Employee Satisfaction, Employee Engagement, and Business Outcomes: 
A Metadata-Analysis, 87 J. Applied Psychol. 268, 276 (2002).  
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to publicize detailed information about how it treats its workers.63 
Doing so might, among other things, be a good way to appeal to 
customers. Companies often choose to make disclosures they are not 
required to make about any number of issues, from hiring practices to 
recycling efforts to environmental practices.64 
The yearning for soft information is creeping into the core of 
financial reporting.65 Given the importance of reliable financial 
statements, even small steps away from the established parameters of 
financial reporting can raise red flags. For example, the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) has recently released a conceptual 
framework that placed a new emphasis on stewardship.66 Whether this 
change alone will result in a change in accounting standards is difficult 
to say, but the use of this word gives me pause. It is not an easy word 
to define. At the time the framework was released, the IASB noted that 
the term “stewardship” had presented difficulties for the international 
body given the challenge of appropriately translating such a meaning-
rich word into the various members’ native languages.67 
Even in English it can be hard to say definitively what 
“stewardship” might mean in the financial reporting context. As one 
scholar has noted, it can mean “management’s honesty in husbanding 
the enterprise resources,”68 or “management’s efficiency in utilizing 
them,”69 or even “providing the shareholders with a suitable return on 
management’s employment of the resources[.]”70 To the extent that 
“stewardship” means simply that the company has implemented 
adequate internal controls and is deploying its capital to economically 
productive ends,71 financial reporting can indeed assist investors and 
 
63. O’Connor, supra note 5, at 534–35 (providing an overview of voluntary 
disclosures concerning human capital).  
64. Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 
Interpretive Release Nos. 33-9106, 34-61469, FR-82, 17 C.F.R. §§ 211, 
231, 241 (Feb. 8, 2010).  
65. Mirko S. Heinle & Christian Hofmann, Soft Information and the 
Stewardship Value of Accounting Disclosure, 33 OR Spectrum 333, 333–
34 (2011).  
66. Int’l Accounting Standards Bd., Conceptual Framework for 
Financial Reporting 8 (2018).  
67. Id. 
68. Stephen A. Zeff, The Objectives of Financial Reporting: A Historical 
Survey and Analysis, 43 Acct. & Bus. Res. 262, 264 (2013). 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., Fin. Accounting Found., 
Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting: Objective of 
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creditors in assessing management’s stewardship.72 The quality of 
“stewardship” in this context is audited under existing standards. But 
to the extent the term means something broader—maybe it 
encompasses, for example, an inquiry into whether management is 
doing a “good” job—things get murkier. 
Financial reporting has always been about financials. These 
financials provide insight into how a company operates, but they do 
not tell us directly about people. The uncertainty that a word like 
“stewardship” presents is the uncertainty of trying to apply the same 
concepts that can provide a reasonably accurate picture of a company’s 
financial situation to a much softer set of variables such as its 
management situation. Additionally, once we have opened the door to 
applying financial reporting to one set of non-financial variables, it is 
too easy to try to apply them to others, such as the so-called 
sustainability factors I discussed earlier.73 
Thus far, the IASB has not taken any concrete steps away from its 
core purpose: setting accounting standards. Indeed, the Chairman of 
the IASB has remarked that the IASB is not well-equipped to address 
sustainability reporting and that “the world of sustainability reporting 
does not provide the same kind of global comparability that exists in 
the world of financial reporting.”74 
I very much agree. Financial reporting loses its value when it is 
applied too broadly to circumstances not amenable to its standards or 
processes. 
Conclusion 
Our financial reporting and corporate disclosure system is essential 
to well-functioning markets, which are, in turn, essential to the ongoing 
provision of the goods and services that make modern lives so safe and 
comfortable. This system has served investors well for many years. 
When we seek to bend this system out of its proper shape, we risk 
undermining the value it provides. Whether we do that by trying to 
account for and audit things that are essentially unauditable, by 
expanding the scope of financial reporting to information that would 
never have been deemed material in the past, or by making auditors  
Financial Reporting and Qualitative Characteristics of 
Decision-Useful Financial Reporting Information 8–9 (2006). 
72. Id. at 9. 
73. Id.; see also supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text. 
74. Hans Hoogervorst, Chair, Int’l Accounting Standards Bd., Speech at the 
Accountancy Europe Event in Brussels: The Times They are A-Changin’ 
(Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.ifrs.org/news-and-events/2017/09/iasb-
chairmans-speech-the-times-the-are-achangin/ [https://perma.cc/JXS9-
4NT4]. 
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the guarantors of management to an extent never intended, we do 
violence to a system that has historically served our markets well. 
Financial reporting deserves more respect from us than that. So too, 
when we attempt to pack our securities disclosures with items that are 
not directly relevant to a company’s long-term financial value, we 
diminish the value of these documents to the investors for whom they 
are intended. 
Thank you all for your time today. I have enjoyed the opportunity 
to be back at CWRU. The topics we are discussing today are important 
ones, so I look forward to hearing your comments and questions. I 
suspect that we all will be contemplating these issues for the next half-
century, although perhaps not as intently as The Thinker. 
 
